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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder submit this Brief in reply to the Brief submitted 
by AGFA. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder stand by their legal analysis, and its 
application to the instant dispute, that is set forth in their Opening Brief. Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder seek to refrain from unnecessarily repeating the 
arguments, regarding the correctness of which they remain confident, that 
appear in that Brief. 
H. ARGUMENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
In its Brief, AGFA attacks the long-established and well-accepted 
scientific method of differential diagnosis and asks this Court to disregard, as a 
matter of law, the opinions of Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's treating physicians 
and a nationally renowned medical expert, in favor of the unreliable and 
arguably irrelevant test results obtained by AGFA'S retained expert John 
Spencer. Any supposed shortcomings or discrepancies in the opinions of Ms. 
Jones ' and Ms. Alder's medical experts go to the weight of those opinions, not 
to their admissibility, and Mr. Spencer should not be allowed to play the role of 
judge and jury. 
AGFA also seeks to "pass the buck" of responsibility, for its failure to 
properly equip and install (or refrain from installing it if it was not safe for the 
environment in which it would be used, or removing it, if people were getting 
sick while working around it) and modify, in a timely fashion, its own 
equipment. The claims advanced by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder do not, contrary 
to AGFA'S characterizations, concern themselves with the hospital ventilation 
system itself. The claims deal with the things suggested in the first sentence of 
this paragraph and with AGFA's failure, after it undertook the responsibility of 
installing its equipment in the subject workplace, and the responsibility of 
servicing that equipment, to properly install the machine, to test what was 
happening with the ventilation ( for the purpose of ensuring that its machine 
was safe for use in the environment in which it was being operated), and to give 
proper warnings to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder and their employer regarding the 
dangers of operating the machine in conditions of inadequate ventilation. 
In what appears to be a somewhat desperate effort to defeat this Appeal, 
AGFA advances the argument that the claims of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder are 
premised upon theories of product liability and are barred by a statute of 
limitations. In support of this argument, AGFA makes the intellectually 
dishonest assertion that the District Court granted AGFA's first Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the limitations issue "in part" and dismissed Ms. 
Jones ' and Ms. Alder's supposed product liability claims. The District Court, in 
fact, denied AGFA's initial Motion for Summary Judgment and agreed with Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder that none of the claims advanced by them should be 
considered "product defect" claims.1 None of the claims brought by Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder in their First Amended Complaint has been dismissed, and 
AGFA's assertion to the contrary is patently erroneous and may, along with its 
1
 As the court may recall, the Court denied AGFA's Petition to appeal the interlocutory order of 
the District Court denying that initial effort by AGFA to throw Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones out of 
court. 
argument that Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's claims are barred by the Utah Code 
Ann., §78-15-3 statute of limitations, fairly be viewed as an index of the 
weakness of AGFA'S overall position in this appeal. 
B. THE TESTIMONY OF AGFA EXPERT JOHN SPENCER DOES 
NOT INVALIDATE THE SCIENTIFICALLY RELIABLE METHOD 
OF DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS NOR DOES IT RENDER 
INADMISSIBLE THE OPINIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS. 
AGFA criticizes the differential diagnosis method and claims that the 
subjective complaints of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, and the temporal 
relationship between their chemical exposure and resulting symptoms, are 
invalid and inadmissible as evidence of causation and damages. AGFA argues 
that these long-established and well-recognized methods of diagnosis are not 
reliable substitutes for the toxicological methods employed by its hired expert, 
John Spencer. AGFA's criticisms are self-serving and disingenuous, as 
established by the case authority cited and arguments made by Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder in their Opening Brief. For the sake of brevity, Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder refer the Court to the arguments advanced in their Opening Brief, at 
pages 33-49, regarding the validity and admissibility of the differential 
diagnosis method, as well as the validity of utilizing a patient's subjective 
complaints and the temporal relationship between a patient's exposure and 
symptoms as bases for making a differential diagnosis. 
With respect to the "toxicological" methods employed by Mr. Spencer, Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder submit that Mr. Spencer's test results are essentially 
meaningless in the context of the present case. Mr. Spencer's test results are, 
at a minimum, not dispositive of any significant issue and should certainly not 
§ 3 
be considered fatal to the claims of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder take issue with AGFA'S assertion that Mr. Spencer's "worst-case 
scenario" air sampling results have gone uncontested. Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder have vigorously disputed and continue to dispute the validity of Mr. 
Spencer's methods and test results. 
Mr. Spencer is perhaps being facetious when he says that he replicated a 
"worst case scenario" for Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's exposure. It is impossible 
for Mr. Spencer to have any idea regarding the extent of the exposure tha t 
would have been sustained by anyone (let alone that to which Ms. Alder and 
Ms. Jones, women who may have been more susceptible than others, were 
subjected) without measuring the chemical build-up in the subject room that 
accumulated day after day after day for a period in excess of two years. Mr. 
Spencer does not suggest that he kept his machinery for testing chemical levels 
going day after day after day for two years to determine the cumulative effect of 
chemical buildup in the subject room during the two years that Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder worked in what AGFA acknowledges to have been the inadequately 
ventilated room in question.2 Especially given his failure to conduct a lengthier 
experiment to determine the chemical levels permeating the room after weeks, 
months, and years of inadequate ventilation, Mr. Spencer's statement that his 
experiment replicates a "worst case scenario" for Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's 
2
 It is interesting that Mr. Spencer does not give any information about the actual length of his 
testing, although he indicates that 74 films were processed during the testing period. Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder surmise that Mr. Spencer's experiment did not last longer than a day or 
two. 
A 
exposure should not be accorded outcome-determinative significance, if any. 
Mr. Spencer's testimony, if admitted, would go only to the weight to be given 
other testimony, including that of Dr. Gray, Dr. Cullen and Dr. Lipsey. It 
would not go to the admissibility of that testimony. 
1. Dr. Lipsey Has Training and Expertise in Toxicology and 
Has Employed Scientifically Accepted and Admissible 
Methods in Arriving at his Opinions in this Case. 
As previously discussed at length in Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's Opening 
Brief, many jurisdictions have allowed expert testimony in cases where the 
expert has been unable to determine the exact level of chemical exposure;3 and, 
in Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999), the court found that 
the plaintiffs' symptoms constituted a valid basis for an expert's conclusion 
that the plaintiffs were exposed to harmful levels of benzene and allowed him to 
so testify. 174 F.3d at 671. 
In the present case, one of the experts retained by Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder, Dr. Richard Lipsey4, has found (similar to what the plaintiffs' expert in 
Curtis found) that the symptoms of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder are of paramount 
3
 See, e^g., Westberrv v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
plaintiffs own subjective reporting provided a valid basis for determining that chemical 
exposure had occurred); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2nd Cir. 1995) (medical 
expert's testimony, based upon differential diagnosis, was reliable and admissible even in the 
absence of evidence pertaining to specific exposure levels); Kannankeril v. Terminix 
International, Inc., 128 F.3d 804 (3rd Cir. 1997) (any claimed shortcoming pertaining to 
evidence regarding exposure suffered in this case goes to the credibility of the evidence, not to 
its admissibility); and Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999) (the law does 
not require the plaintiffs to show the precise level of chemicals to which they were exposed). 
4
 In the event that the Court determines, for whatever reason and contrary to Ms. Jones ' and 
Ms. Alder's position, that Dr. Lipsey's opinions ought, as a matter of law, not be considered, the 
Court should keep it squarely in mind that the success or failure of this Appeal does not 
depend on Dr. Lipsey. For, as is explained in the Opening Brief, the position of Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder is satisfactorily supported by other clearly competent evidence. 
importance in his determination that they were exposed to harmful levels of 
chemical fum.es in their workplace. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding in 
Curtis, AGFA asserts that such reasoning is "circular" and does not provide a 
proper basis for a conclusion that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were exposed to 
harmful levels of chemicals. AGFA's refusal to accord any significance to the 
symptoms these women developed after the Curix machine was moved to the 
badly ventilated room is contrary to the law cited herein. 
Dr. Lipsey is a toxicologist and obtained his Ph.D. from the University of 
Illinois in 1972. [R 1783] His degree was obtained from the Department of 
Entomology, but his studies and focus was in toxicology. [R 1783] He is on 
the faculty of the American Academy of Environmental Medicine, and is a 
member of the Environmental Protection Board, the University of Florida 
Medical Center, Toxicology Committee, and the University of North Florida 
Adjunct Faculty for Hazardous Chemicals. [R 1784] Dr. Lipsey was a 
Professor at the University of North Florida where he taught toxicology. Now 
Dr. Lipsey is an adjunct Professor at the University of North Florida. [R 1784] 
Clearly, Dr. Lipsey is well qualified to give opinions regarding Ms. Jones ' and 
Ms. Alder's exposure to toxic chemicals in their workplace. 
Based, among other things, on his review of the symptoms that Ms. Alder 
and Ms. Jones developed, Dr. Lipsey is able to determine that they were 
exposed to toxic chemical fumes of levels significant enough to cause their 
illnesses. According to Dr. Lipsey, the symptoms experienced by Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder are identical to the symptoms listed in the scientific literature as 
potential health consequences from exposure to the chemicals utilized in film 
processing and are the same types of symptoms that one would expect to result 
from being in a small, poorly ventilated room for an extended period of time 
with chronic exposure. [R 1786] Dr. Lipsey has visited the subject workplace 
and is familiar with the internal documents of the employer of Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder that refer to the lack of proper ventilation, the stale, warm air, the 
strong chemical odor every day, the lack of proper air exchanges and all of the 
modifications that had to be made to the Curix machine to achieve better 
ventilation. [R 1786] According to Dr. Lipsey, there is a strong correlation 
between Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's symptoms and the illnesses caused by 
significant exposure to photo-processing chemicals. [R 1786]. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that serious injuries can 
occur from exposure to chemicals at levels below "regulated" standards. [R 
1784] Consequently, the standards, themselves, are not dispositive of the 
question of whether Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder became ill by reason of exposure 
to toxic chemical fumes in their workplace. According to Dr. Lipsey, serious 
injuries can occur from exposure to chemicals at levels below the standards 
prescribed by organizations such as OSHA, NIOSH and/or ACGIH. [R 1784] 
He further testified that such standards should always, at a minimum, be 
observed but that compliance with such standards will not guarantee that 
all individuals will be safe from chemical exposure that would become 
harmful to them. [R 1784] A "toxic" dose to one individual will be different 
than a "toxic" dose to another individual. [R 1785] 
In Dr. Lipsey's opinion, one does not have to be able to prove the level of 
exposure in order to determine that an individual has suffered a harmful 
chemical exposure. Dr. Lipsey testified that a temporal relationship between 
an exposure and resulting symptomatology is evidence of a harmful exposure 
[R 1784-85] and that the symptoms experienced by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
are consistent with chemical exposure. [R 1786] 
An expert's level of expertise goes to the weight of the testimony, not to 
its admissibility. AGFA has gone to great lengths to discredit Dr. Lipsey. It is 
well established that a court may not exclude the testimony of a proposed 
expert "simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be 
the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the 
specialization the court considers most appropriate." U.S. v. Van Wyk, 83 
F.Supp.2d 515 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting: Holbrook v. Lvkes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 
80 F.3d 777, 782 (3rd Cir. 1996) In support of its holding, the court stated as 
follows: 
The expert need not have complete knowledge about the field in question, 
need not be certain, and need not be unbiased. The expert must only be 
able to aid the jury in resolving a relevant issue. While the level of 
expertise may affect the weight to be accorded the expert's opinion, it 
does not affect admissibility. 
Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d at 518 (Emphasis added); See also: DeLuca v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3rd Cir. 1990) (the rules 
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony provide for the admission of 
evidence with any marginal utility absent a substantial countervailing 
concern). Consequently, AGFA'S attempts to discredit Dr. Lipsey on the basis 
of his qualifications, knowledge, and experience should not be a basis for 
determining the admissibility of his testimony; rather, those types of issues are 
for the jury to consider in assessing the weight to be given to Dr. Lipsey's 
testimony. 
2. Any Shortcomings or Discrepancies in a Differential 
Diagnosis Go To the Weight and Credibility, Not the 
Admissibility, of the Testimony. 
AGFA'S argument that the differential diagnosis method is not a reliable 
substitute for the toxicological methods employed by its expert, Mr. Spencer, 
and is therefore inadmissible, is without merit. As previously discussed at 
length in the Opening Brief of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, differential diagnosis is 
a long-established, well-accepted, scientific method of diagnosing disease. Any 
perceived shortcomings in the experts' opinions based upon a differential 
diagnosis go to the weight and credibility, not the admissibility, of those 
opinions. It is well established that in order to be a valid differential diagnosis, 
the physician need not rule out every other possible cause for the condition in 
question. Westberrv v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
In Westberrv, the defendant argued that Dr. Isenhower's differential 
diagnosis was unreliable because he failed to "rule out" all other potential 
causes. 178 F.3d at 265. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court held 
that "[a] medical expert's causation conclusion should not be excluded because 
he or she has failed to rule out every possible alternative cause of Plaintiff's 
illness." 178 F.3d at 265 (quoting Heller, 167 F.3d at 156). Rather, the 
alternative causes suggested by a defendant "affect the weight that the jury 
should give the expert's testimony and not the admissibility of that testimony." 
Id. Perceived faults in a physician's differential diagnosis "are matters for 
cross-examination that do not affect admissibility." McCullock, 61 F.3d at 
1044. 
In addition, it is well established that if two or more of a party's experts 
disagree with one another or have contrary or differing opinions, that does not 
affect the admissibility of those opinions. Walker v. Soo Line Railroad 
Company, 208 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2000). In Walker, the court held that the fact 
that "two different experts reach opposing conclusions from the same 
information does not render their opinions inadmissible" 208 F.3d at 589 
(citing Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999) ("merely because two qualified experts reach directly opposite 
conclusions using similar, if not identical, data bases . . . does not necessarily 
mean that, under Daubert, one opinion is per se unreliable.") Thus, in the 
present case, the fact that the medical experts and treating physicians of Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder may offer opinions that differ in some respects does not 
render their opinions inadmissible or unreliable, and AGFA'S argument to the 
contrary should be disregarded. 
In addition, an expert physician may rely upon the reports and 
examinations performed by other doctors in making their differential diagnoses 
and is not required to perform a separate examination of a patient. 
Kannankeril v. Terminix International, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3rd Cir. 1997). In 
i n 
Kannankeril, the plaintiff entered into a contract with Terminix for the control 
of carpenter ants through the application of pesticides to certain interior and 
exterior portions of the plaintiffs residence. After four months of Dursban 
applications, the plaintiff began experiencing symptoms that caused her to fear 
that the pesticide applications were adversely affecting her health and 
terminated the applications. Thereafter, in the months and years following the 
application of the pesticides, plaintiff developed additional health problems 
including "chronic toxicity," "cognitive deficits/' and "sensitization to multiple 
other chemicals.* Dr. Kannankeril had been employed as a physician and had 
to terminate her practice as a result of her poor health. 
At trial, the plaintiffs medical expert testified that: 
The temporal relationship and the nature of her complaints lead me to 
conclude that, with reasonable medical certainty, the cause of Dr. 
Kannankerifs Central Nervous System manifestations of toxicity is 
exposure to Dursban in 1989 to 1990. 
128 F.3d at 806. The medical expert never actually examined Dr. Kannankeril. 
Instead, he reviewed the records of her medical history and relied upon reports 
prepared by other physicians. The expert's findings were based on (1) Dr. 
Kannankerifs account of her cognitive symptoms; (2) the report prepared by 
Dr. Ellen Grober, a neuropsychologist who examined Dr. Kannankeril; (3)a 
summary report regarding the Dursban applications to the Kannankeril home; 
and (4) his general experience and knowledge. 
In holding that the medical expert's testimony was admissible, the Court 
of Appeals recognized the widely accepted method of differential diagnosis and 
stated that "the elements of a differential diagnosis may consist of the 
performance of physical examinations, the taking of medical histories, and the 
review of clinical tests, including laboratory tests." 128 F.3d at 807. However, 
the court held that a "doctor does not have to employ all of these techniques in 
order for the doctor's diagnosis to be reliable." Id. Indeed, the court stated as 
follows: 
Depending on the medical condition at issue and on the clinical 
information already available, a physician may reach a reliable 
differential diagnosis without himself performing a physical examination, 
particularly if there are other examination results available. In fact, it is 
perfectly acceptable, in arriving at a diagnosis, for a physician to rely on 
examinations and tests performed by other medical practitioners. 
128 F.3d at 807 (emphasis added). See also: Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., No. 
96-16034, 1998 WL 614654 (9th Cir. 1998) (where the court held that a doctor 
could testify as an expert on the cause of a seaman's injury based solely on his 
professional background and his review of the seaman's medical records). 
Furthermore, the court in Kannankeril held that the medical expert's 
testimony was admissible even though he was aware of a test result that 
produced normal results. The court recognized that "the blood test for 
cholinesterase levels is the most accepted test method for determining 
exposure to Dursban." Id. However, the court went on to explain as follows: 
. . . the cholinesterase test result is but one of the factors considered by 
Dr. Gerson. Despite the negative results from this test, Dr. Gerson still 
opined that, as a matter of reasonable medical certainty, Dursban had 
caused Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive impairment. It is for the jury to 
decide whether a single cholinesterase test , yielding results within 
normal limits, outweighs the other factors relied upon by Dr. Gerson 
and undermines his opinion. This is an issue of credibility, not of 
admissibility. 
128 F.3d at 807 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the present case, the fact that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had 
normal test results to a glutaraldehyde patch test is of no consequence to the 
admissibility of the medical testimony in this case. It is clear, based upon the 
well-reasoned case law cited herein, and in their Opening Brief, that the 
differential diagnosis method employed by Ms. Jones ' and Ms. Alder's treating 
physicians and other experts is a well-accepted, standard, and scientifically 
reliable technique upon which to base a medical opinion. 
The case law cited clearly demonstrates that any claimed shortcomings 
in the differential diagnosis process become the subject matter for cross-
examination and go to the question of credibility and weight to be given to the 
testimony not to its admissibility. 
The testimony of Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's medical experts, based on 
the differential diagnosis method, should be admitted. 
3. MCS is a Valid Diagnosis. 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder contest many of the statements made by AGFA 
in its Brief. For example, Ms. Jones' and Ms. Alder's experts have never 
conceded that MCS is not considered a valid diagnosis and is not generally 
accepted in the scientific community, as claimed by AGFA at page 10 of its 
Brief. On the contrary, Drs. Cullen, Suruda, Robinson and Bateman all 
testified that MCS is a valid disease entity. [R 1748, 1752-54, 1767, 1768 and 
1783]. Furthermore, according to Dr. Cullen, this illness is the subject of at 
least 200 peer scientific literature publications written within the last decade. 
[R 1782]. Dr. Cullen testified that "there is a preponderance of scientific 
observation and scientific literature suggesting that this pattern of illness is 
well described and describable." [R 1782] 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder also contest AGFA'S claim that "[n]one of 
Appellant's experts can identify a known cause for MCS" made at page 10 of 
AGFA'S Brief. Dr. Cullen specifically testified that chemicals play a role in 
causing MCS, and that the cause of MCS, "chemical exposure", is known, and 
that what is not yet understood in the medical community is the exact pathway 
between the iirst set of events [the chemical exposure] and the latter syndrome 
that develops. Dr. Cullen does not believe that the actual condition of MCS is 
in dispute. [R 1768, 1783] It is perhaps essential that the Court understand 
this precise point of Dr. Cullen's testimony. 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder also contest AGFA'S statements that "it is 
undisputed and unchallenged on this appeal, that there is no accepted 
diagnostic criteria for, and no known cause of MCS" and that there is "no 
objective testing to confirm an MCS diagnosis" alleged at pages 16 and 19 of 
AGFA'S Brief. Again, Dr. Cullen testified that chemical exposure causes MCS. 
[R 1783]. He also testified that MCS is a distinct clinical syndrome that has 
reasonable criteria for diagnosis. [R 1783], and he identified the accepted 
diagnostic criteria of MCS during his deposition testimony. [R 1767]5 Finally, 
Dr. Cullen identified several objective tests to verify or confirm an MCS 
5
 Dr. Cullen identified the following diagnostic criteria for MCS: (1) that the patient has been in 
stable, generally good health prior to some environmental exposure; and (2) that there was 
some symptomatic response to the environmental exposure which reoccurs at lower levels of 
exposure. [R 1767]. Dr. Cullen testified that the next two diagnostic criteria for MCS have to 
do with what is known as "generalization of the process" so that additional chemicals begin to 
bother the individual and the pattern of symptoms expand. [R Id.] 
diagnosis, including (without limitation) the temporal relationship of the 
patient's reported symptoms to his/her exposure (which would provide 
objective data in support of the patient's subjective complaints); the patient's 
behavior (which would provide objective evidence of the patient's subjective 
complaints); and the patient's past medical history (which would provide 
objective evidence and validation that the patient's subjective complaints arise 
out of the exposure event). [R 1768] 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder also contest AGFA'S claim, set forth at page 14 
of its Brief, that there is "undisputed evidence that MCS is not associated with 
exposure to x-ray processing chemicals or to any other chemical exposure and 
[there is] uncontradicted data that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were not exposed 
to any chemicals at levels known to cause harm." These statements by AGFA 
are also wrong and are contradicted by the testimony of Drs. Cullen, Gray and 
Lipsey. 
Specifically, Dr. Cullen testified that MCS is caused by chemical 
exposure. [R 1783]. He also testified that glutaraldehyde and hydroquinone 
are irritating materials and that, in his opinion, there is significant 
circumstantial evidence that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were exposed to levels of 
one or both of these chemicals well in excess of their irritation thresholds.6 [R 
1772] Dr. Cullen also testified that there is good evidence that the ventilation 
6
 As support, if the Court needs any, for the proposition that circumstantial evidence is as good 
as direct evidence, for the purpose of defeating motions, on causation issues, for summary 
judgment, and for the proposition that the drawing of reasonable inferences can and should be 
allowed to defeat such motions, see, e.g., Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 479 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah 
1972); Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624-25 (Utah App. 1991). 
in Plaintiffs' workplace was woefully inadequate and t h a t . . . "one of the 
chemicals involved in development, or all of them together, were important 
contributing features here." [R 1775] There is no reason, on the facts of this 
case, for the Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the conclusions of Ms. 
Jones ' and Ms. Alder's experts must be any more specific than that. For it is 
unquestionably true that all of these chemicals were processed through the 
machine that AGFA provided and serviced. Dr. Cullen also testified that 
Plaintiffs' transitory symptoms, such as headache, difficulty concentrating, 
upper respiratory symptoms, and hoarseness are "toxicologically well explained 
epidemiologically highly consistent human responses to exposure to a very 
large class of chemicals called irritants." [R 1778]. In Dr. Cullen's opinion, 
there is no doubt that the onset of illnesses suffered by Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder was the result of the chemical exposure they suffered in their workplace. 
[R 1782] 
With respect to these issues, Dr. Gray testified that the laboratory tests 
he performed on Ms. Jones confirm to him that she is reactive to the chemicals 
that she worked with. [R 1764] He also testified that "the mixture of 
chemicals, which included hydroquinone, glutaraldehyde and sulfur dioxide 
and some amounts of ammonia, created conditions necessary and sufficient to 
induce immunotoxicity in [Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder] . . . I believe we can say 
that the aggregate impact of the exposure to the combination of compounds in 
the manner in which the ingestions occurred did indeed induce toxic 
encephalopathy." [R 1765] 
According to Dr. Lipsey, the symptoms experienced by Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder are the symptoms listed in the scientific literature as potential health 
consequences from exposure to the chemicals utilized in film processing and 
are the same types of symptoms that one would expect to result from being in a 
small, poorly ventilated room for an extended period of time with chronic 
exposure. [R 1786]. Dr. Lipsey testified that the symptoms experienced by Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder are consistent with chemical exposure, and that there is a 
strong correlation between their symptoms and photo-processing chemicals. [R 
Id.] Dr. Lipsey also testified that injuries can still occur even if the chemical 
exposure levels are below standards, particularly with repeated and prolonged 
exposures as occurred in the case of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. [R 1786-87] 
In short, many of the statements made by AGFA in its Brief pertaining to 
the "undisputed" or "uncontested" nature of certain facts are false; and there 
are, indeed, disputed questions of material fact that should have caused the 
District Court to deny AGFA's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. Notwithstanding the Validity of MCS, the Illnesses 
Sustained By Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder are Not Limited to 
MCS, as They Suffer From Several Recognized Disease 
Entities. 
AGFA argues that if the Court rejects the MCS diagnosis, Ms. Jones and 
Ms. Alder cannot establish damages. This contention is false. The medical 
testimony in this case establishes that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder suffer from 
many commonly recognized disease entities as a result of their chemical 
exposures, including neurological and cognitive deficits, brain damage, 
respiratory problems, headaches, chronic fatigue syndrome, and fibromyalgia, 
to name a few. Even if this Court for some reason rejects the evidence 
regarding MCS, that determination should go only to the question of what 
specific evidence Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder may introduce at trial, and to the 
amounts of their damages. It should by no means be outcome-determinative. 
Dr. Robinson testified, for example, that in her opinion, Ms. Alder's test 
results indicate, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that Ms. Alder 
has suffered some form of chemical insult, and she opined, to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability, that there is a part of Ms. Alder's brain that has 
been damaged. [R 1751] In Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder has a problem 
in neurocognitive function and has some dysfunction in her ability to think. 
Dr. Robinson independently analyzed the result of neuropsychological tests 
taken by Ms. Alder. According to Dr. Robinson, "there are demonstrable 
abnormalities in Ms. Alder's neuropsychometric testing that would suggest that 
she would have difficult in performing tasks she could previously do." [R 1750] 
Furthermore, in Dr. Robinson's opinion, Ms. Alder's Chronic Fatigue Syndrome 
was caused by chemical exposure in her workplace, and her pre-existing 
depression was exacerbated by the symptomatology that she experienced as an 
immediate result of the exposure in the workplace. [R 1752] 
Similarly, and as merely another example, Dr. Janiece Pompa diagnosed 
Ms. Jones with cognitive deficits and testified that she believes, to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability, that Ms. Jones ' cognitive deficits observed in Dr. 
Pompa's testing were caused by the chemical exposure she suffered in her 
workplace. [R 1757] 
Dr. Gray diagnosed Ms. Alder as having (1) glutaraldehyde exposure and 
toxicity; (2) immune toxicity; (3) toxic encephalopathy; (4) reactive airways 
disease; and (5) latex sensitivity and attributed these problems to the chemical 
exposure she suffered in her workplace. [R 1762-64] He also diagnosed Ms. 
Jones as having (1) glutaraldehyde exposure; (2) immune toxicity; and (3) toxic 
encephalopathy, and he attributed these conditions to the chemical exposure 
she suffered in her workplace. [R Id.] 
Dr. Lipsey testified that the symptoms experienced by Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder are the symptoms listed in the scientific literature as potential health 
consequences from exposure to chemicals utilized in film processing and are 
the same types of symptoms that one would expect to result from a person's 
being in a small, poorly ventilated room for an extended period of time with 
chronic exposure. [R 1786] Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder suffer from a variety of illnesses and problems as a result of 
their chemical exposure. 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder have not alleged, in their Amended complaint, 
that they suffer from MCS. [R 249-255] Rather, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder have 
only alleged that their health has been compromised and they are ill as a result 
of their exposure to chemicals in their workplace. [R Id.] The illnesses they 
suffer include conditions that have been long-accepted and well-recognized in 
the medical community, including (without limitation) cognitive and 
neuropsychological deficits, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, increased 
depression, headaches, muscle aches, reactive airways disease and toxic 
encephalopathy. [R 1749-66] Based upon the foregoing, even if this Court 
somehow concludes that MCS is not a valid disease entity, Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder can still prove they have been damaged and should be allowed to do so. 
C. THE DUTIES OF CARE AGFA OWED TO MS. JONES AND MS. 
ALDER DO NOT CONCERN THE HOSPITAL VENTILATION 
SYSTEM, PER SE, AND ARE PREMISED ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE, NOT THE LAW OF STRICT LIABILITY 
GOVERNING PRODUCT DEFECTS. 
AGFA has misapprehended or misrepresented the bases asserted by Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder for imposing duties of care upon AGFA in this matter. 
AGFA claims it owed no duty of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder regarding the 
installation, testing or maintenance of the hospital's ventilation system. This 
claim is irrelevant to the present case, inasmuch as Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
have never asserted that AGFA owed it a duty of care with respect to the 
installation, operation, and/or maintenance of the hospital's ventilation 
system. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder acknowledge that AGFA did not design, 
install, or maintain the ventilation system in the hospital where they were 
employed. However, AGFA did design, install, maintain, and service its own 
Curix Compact Daylight Processing Machine. It is AGFA'S failure to act 
reasonably in dealing with its own machine, not the hospital's ventilation 
system, that provides the basis for the claims asserted by Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder. 
AGFA'S argument that it owed no duty of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder with respect to the hospital's ventilation system is non-responsive to the 
arguments advanced by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder in their Opening Brief. Ms. 
Jones and Ms. Alder refer the Court to the discussion regarding AGFA'S duties 
of care, none of which concerns responsibility for the hospital's ventilation 
system, set forth at pages 24-31 of their Opening Brief. 
AGFA'S second line of attack on the issue of duty is to contend that the 
duties Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder ascribe to them fall under product liability law 
(presumably strict liability product liability law) instead of negligence law. This 
contention is without merit. Lest there be any misunderstanding, Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder have never claimed and do not now claim that the Curix 
machine was "defective." The claims of Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder are negligence 
claims only and are not strict liability claims based upon product defects. 
The duties AGFA owed to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder arise under negligence law, 
not "product liability law" as that term is commonly understood. 
Contrary to AGFA'S contentions, the Restatement provisions relied upon 
by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, in support of their argument that AGFA owed 
them certain duties of care, apply to negligence claims and do not relate to the 
strict liability concepts of product liability. In support of its contention that it 
owes no duty of care to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder under the relevant 
Restatement provisions, AGFA cites a different Restatement provision (402A, 
comment j). The provision AGFA relies upon, however, relates to strict liability 
claims involving product defects, not to negligence claims. It is inapplicable to 
the present case. 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder explained in detail the duties of care AGFA 
owed to them, and the bases for imposing those duties, in their Opening Brief 
O 1 
and refer the Court to that discussion, at pages 24-31, the substance of which 
has been essentially ignored and not really contested by AGFA. 
D. AGFA'S ARGUMENT THAT THE CLAIMS OF MS. JONES AND 
MS. ALDER ARE TIME-BARRED UNDER THE PRODUCTS 
LIABILTY ACT IS DESPERATE AND DEVOID OF MERIT. 
AGFA'S contention that the District Court "dismissed" Ms. Jones ' and 
Ms. Alder's supposed "product liability" claims as time-barred and its pursuit 
of the statute of limitations issue are misguided, misleading and, as suggested 
at the outset of this Brief, an indication of AGFA'S lack of confidence in its 
overall position in this Appeal. This case is a negligence case, and the claims 
being pursued by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder are negligence claims, governed by 
the four (4) year "residuary" statute: Utah Code Ann., Section 78-12-25. 
The District Court agreed with Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder that the claims 
set forth in their Amended Complaint deal with principles of negligence and 
that Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-15-1 et seq., dealing with "product defects" 
are not applicable to this lawsuit. [R 1197-98] The District Court denied 
AGFA'S Motion for Summary Judgment on the limitations issue and found 
that, in accordance with the position taken by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, none 
of the claims asserted by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were "product defect" claims 
or claims subject to the limitations period found in the products liability act. 
Id. 
As the Court will observe, especially from paragraph 16 of the Amended 
Complaint filed by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder in this matter, [R ] this case is a 
negligence case, one that alleges failures of human beings, not product defects. 
AGFA'S heroic efforts to cast this case in a manner that Ms. Alder and 
Ms. Jones have never cast it notwithstanding, the fact remains that this has 
never been a claim involving allegations of "defect in a product." (See Utah 
Code Ann. §78-15-6). The legislation (codified as Utah Code Ann. §§78-15-1 
through -6), in which appears the statute of limitations upon which AGFA 
relies deals only with claims of "defect in a product." It is clear that that 
statute is a strict liability statute and that §78-15-3, the 2-year limitations 
statute, deals only with claims brought "under this chapter." (Emphasis 
added.) "This chapter" deals only with strict liability principles, including the 
meaning of "unreasonably dangerous" (a stranger to negligence law). 
It has long been well established law in other jurisdictions that claims of 
negligence, even if they deal with negligent manufacture (and the claims in 
question here don't even do that), are analytically distinct from claims of strict 
products liability. See, e.g., Avers v. Johnson & Johnson, 797 P.2d 529 (Wash. 
App. 1990); Talkington v. Atria Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV, 152 F.3d 254 
(4th Cir. 1998); Sharp v. J.I. Case Corp., 573 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. App. 1997); 
Brown v. Yamaha Motor Corp, 38 Wash. App. 914, 691 P.2d 577 (1984); Davis 
v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., Inc., 102 Wash.2d 68, 684 p.2d 692 (1984); and 
Lockwood v. A.C.& S., Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 251, 254, 744 P.2d 605 (1987). 
This Court recently, in Slisze v. Stanley Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 
1999) (mention of which is noticeably absent from AGFA'S Brief, although it 
was brought to the District Court's and AGFA'S attention by Ms. Alder and 
Ms. Jones), made it clear that the law of the State of Utah is the same. 
There is no suggestion in the language of the "product defect" statutory 
scheme, or elsewhere in Utah law, that, for negligence claims, anything other 
than the four-year "residuary" limitations period found in Utah Code Ann. §78-
12-25 should apply to claims of negligence. Furthermore, and as a review of 
the Amended Complaint will cause this Court to realize, there is no allegation 
of a "defect" in the manufacture or design of the subject AGFA-built daylight 
processor. The focus has been and remains on acts and omissions of AGFA 
personnel in dealing with that machine. AGFA'S contention that the claims of 
Ms. Jones and Alder are product defect claims is tantamount to a contention 
by General Motors, in a case in which an employee of General Motors is alleged 
negligently to have inspected, maintained, serviced, or driven, a Chevrolet, that 
such a claim is in essence a "product defect" claim. 
AGFA relies on a United States District Court case, Strickland v. General 
Motors Corp., 852 F. Supp. 956 (D. Utah 1994). Strickland was not a decision 
of this Court, and was, for purposes pertinent hereto, effectively nullified by 
Slisze; and, in any event, the negligence claim in Strickland dealt with 
negligent manufacture (something that has not been alleged in this case). The 
former statutory language has no applicability and, in any event, Ms. Alder and 
Ms. Jones have never alleged a defect or failure in relation to a product. Their 
claims have dealt with and continue to deal with failures of persons - AGFA 
employees. 
Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones also bring to the Court's attention the 
proposition that there are serious issues of fact to consider if the Court should 
for some reason accept AGFA'S contention that this is a "product defect" case 
subject to the two-year statute of limitations, with respect to the questions of 
when Ms. Alder discovered and when Ms. Jones discovered, or should in the 
exercise of due diligence have discovered, the "harm" to them and its "cause." 
Facts in support of the proposition that, at a minimum, triable questions of 
fact remain for determination appear in a District Court memorandum 
submitted by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder [R 1743-47]; and Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder incorporate in this Brief, by this reference, the discussion of those facts 
there set forth. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis and on the points and authorities set 
forth in their Opening Brief, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder urge the Court to reverse 
the Summary Judgment and to return this case to the District Court for trial, 
with whatever instructions the Court deems appropriate. 
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